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1.  Introduction 
 
       Why is the political system sometimes so sluggish in dealing with environmental problems 
and at other times capable of very rapid responses?  To put it more generally, why does the political 
system sometimes seem so slow and backwards looking when the capitalist system seems so pro-
active, nimble, and forwards looking?   No one doubts the tremendous benefits bestowed upon 
humankind by the creative dynamism of capitalism but the rapid change and continual introduction 
of new technologies rapidly increases the number and magnitude of negative externality problems 
that governments must control in order to optimize benefits net of external costs.   
Governments seem to be losing the race to create effective institutions to do this job. It is 
easy to list current symbols of this mismatch:  (i) SUV's continue to multiply, putting small car 
owners in increasing danger of colliding with one of these behemoths; (ii) McMansions continue to 
gobble up the landscape while the tax system still encourages this wasteful consumption that spoils 
the views of others; (iii) use of lawn chemicals continues unabated though lakes are eutrophied and 
water wells are poisoned; (iv) pollution from industrial agriculture and factory farms continues to 
increase while evidence of the increasing "off the books"  costs  of our "cheap food" policy is there 
for anyone to see.  One can go on with a depressing litany of similar ailments where the "cure" is 
clear but action is lacking.  
It almost seems as if, since environmental goods are "free" until government gets organized 
to regulate and impose costs for using them, that too much of technical "progress" evolves to   2
economize on these "free" inputs. Clearly, if there were no governmental (or other "social" controls 
such as "social stigma" and ethical norms) innovation would continue to economize on priced 
inputs and use non-priced inputs to the point where society itself might ultimately collapse under 
the weight of its own wastes. I call this process "Flat of the Curve Induced Innovation."  
       Indeed, Nordhaus (1992) lists this inability of the political system to react as a potential 
limiting factor to human progress that might be more serious than the usual limiting factors of 
exhaustible and renewable resources that capture the attention of ecologists and other natural 
scientists in debates about the "limits to growth."  For example, in discussing potential limits to 
growth, he states, 
 
"One possibility is that the scale of human activity could overwhelm the capacity of 
the globe to tolerate industrial wastes, this, in turn, could drive the cost of reducing 
or recycling wastes to astronomical levels. This is the "scale limit." A second 
possibility is the "political limit."   While reducing harmful side effects is in 
principle possible at modest cost, human societies might lack the political will or 
skill to take measures to internalize the externalities." 
 
Thus, the fate of society may ultimately depend on whether the human race wins this "human race." 
    Negative externalities from consumption patterns may even be more important than 
negative externalities from production patterns.  The process is the same Flat of the Curve 
phenomenon in which people use non-priced inputs to satisfy their desires, driving the increment in 
satisfaction towards zero. A major role for social norms, social stigmatization and ethics is to check 
this process if government is not doing its job but there is evidence that these social mechanisms 
are not adequate.  Brock and Taylor (2003b) report data on several major pollutants, which show 
that industry's share has dropped while consumption's share has risen.   
       A current metaphor for failure of social mechanisms is the continued growth of behemoth 
SUV's, which offload uncompensated risks onto other drivers while SUV owners seem to act as if 
they have a right to drive the things without paying compensation for the negative externalities they 
impose on the rest of the motoring public.  Despite attempts to instill stigma, norms, and ethics via 
such campaigns as "What Would Jesus Drive?"  the social mechanism of internalizing these 
externalities does not appear to be working.   3
Notice that the political system sometimes does act if the pressure is strong.  Witness the 
nimbleness of Congress to act to protect the "Do Not Call List" as the courts kept throwing up 
roadblocks under the guise of rather generous interpretations of the Founding Fathers' intent to 
protect free speech. Congress knew that over 50 million people signed up for this popular list.  
When the median voter moves to a transparent position with enough intensity, the political system 
can (and will) act quickly.   But the mystery remains:  Telemarketers have been annoying the public 
for a long time--why the sudden action by government at this particular moment? The problem was 
obvious to all for a long time. Then, suddenly, a rare bipartisan consensus of both houses of 
Congress as well as the Executive rapidly  "tipped" against an incredibly powerful special interest 
group (the telemarketing lobby). Why did this abrupt change occur after a long period of inaction in 
the face of long-standing public frustration?  We try to shed light on such abrupt changes in 
government policy responses to long- festering problems with the models developed in this paper. 
       Natural  and  social  scientists  have  worked hard to understand dynamical processes that 
produce punctuated equilibrium behavior.  There are many kinds of models that do so: "sand-pile" 
models, "tipping point" models, "small world" models and other graph-theoretic models, "complex 
adaptive systems" models and models that produce punctuated dynamics via a hierarchy of time 
scales.
ii  
Unfortunately, despite the emergence  of  terms like "power laws", "scaling laws", "tipping 
points,", "complex systems,"  into the popular culture and despite the enormous publicity given to  
work  in  the complex systems area, there is a very difficult "identification" issue  that must be 
faced by social  scientists:   Many  dynamical  processes that have little to do with complex  
systems  processes produce identical  empirical patterns.  This problem is closely related to  the  
well  known "identification problem" in econometrics: How does one  use  data  to distinguish 
among observationally equivalent structures? Such an identification problem turns up  in  the   
attempt  to  use  data  to separate "true" social dynamics that produce punctuated  equilibrium  
behavior from "spurious" social dynamics created by exogenous dynamics of unobserved 
variables.
iii  This identification issue is especially important in deciding whether the sluggish 
political system acts suddenly because of "endogenous" emergence of pressure which "tips" it or 
whether it acts suddenly because an exogenous change acts on it, a change that may have little to 
do with the punctuated equilibrium dynamics of policy change discussed by Gunderson and 
Holling (2002)).    4
       In this paper we present some simple models of  the  dynamics  of problem recognition,  the  
emergence  of  pressure  from  the  public  to  do something about it and the final tipping of the 
system into political action.  While we will not be able to resolve the tough empirical identification 
issues mentioned above, we will occasionally warn the reader about them. We concentrate in this 
paper on modeling the self-emergence of pressure on the political system.  Then we apply these 
models to some of the policy problems as well as to some of the ideas that are considered elsewhere 
in this volume.   
 
2.  Minimal Models of Social Choice Dynamics: The “Mean Field” Case 
 
       This exposition uses ideas from discrete  choice  theory  in  economics and simple models 
of phase transition from statistical physics to model why social systems may get stuck in "social 
traps".  The goal is not only to understand why a social system cannot move to a more efficient 
state but also to help find ways to break out of social traps.
iv The  basic  idea  of  discrete  choice  
theory  is  that the preferences  (Anderson,  de  Palma,  and  Thisse  (1992)),  of  agent  i  are 
stochastic, and are composed of a  deterministic  part  and  a  random  part.  Scheffer et al. (2000), 
(2003), hereafter, S(2000),  S(2003),  use  discrete choice theory and build on the work of Brock 
and Durlauf (1999)  in  modeling abrupt  paradigm  shifts  in  science  and  Brock  and  Durlauf's   
(2001a,b), hereafter, "BD(2001)", general treatment of interactions-based models to model the 
emergence of new problems, followed  by  lagged  recognition,  followed  by eventual action 
mobilization of pressure on the political system, followed  by possible action by the political 
system.   
       This work modeled not only tipping points and such other social interaction phenomena as 
peer group effects and social capital but also emphasized the empirical difficulties of using data to 
separate such phenomena from correlated observables and selection effects.  "Selection effects" 
refer to the general tendency for social groups to self-select because they share common 
preferences, experiences or constraints, many of which are impossible for an empirical scientist to 
observe.  It is very difficult to use observational field data to distinguish the effects of commonly 
shared unobservables from endogenous social dynamics, which are associated with the currently 
popular phenomenon of social capital.
v   In order to infer the correct policy action it is important to 
separate endogenous social interactions from exogenous social interactions   If the social   5
interactions are endogenous, there is scope for policy action to catalyze "good" social interactions 
with some sort of incentives and to discourage "bad" social interactions, i.e. attempts to discourage 
formation of "bad" social capital in certain socially pathological groups. These efforts of 
government would be wasted if the social interactions turned out to be spurious.  
This chapter discusses the potential for abrupt change, bifurcations, hysteresis, and other 
dynamic phenomena, as does the work of S(2000), and S(2003). "Bifurcation" refers to a change in 
a stable state of a dynamical system at a faster time scale when a parameter on slower moving time 
scale goes through a critical value that causes the stable state on the fast time scale to become 
unstable. "Hysteresis" refers to a behavior of a dynamical system caused by a parameter slowly 
moving "up", such that the dynamical system shifts to an alternative stable state on a faster time 
scale when the parameter moves "up" beyond a certain critical value, but to "recover" the old stable 
state that same slow moving parameter has to be brought "down" to a level quite far below the 
original value that triggered the move in the first place.  This is a phenomenon of partial 
irreversibility that is important in the benefit cost analysis of ecological systems, e.g. lake systems 
where oligotrophy and eutrophy are alternative stable states (Gunderson and Holling (2002)). 
Now consider a community of social agents, call them i=1,2,...,N, facing  two policy 
options, call them -1,+1.  Let the status quo be  -1 and let the difference in utility for agent i 
between the two options be denoted by 
 
(2.1)  Hi(t) =  hi(t) + ni(t), 
 
where n is a random variable and h is deterministic; i.e., just some number.  Notice that we are 
allowing both h and n to depend upon the agent and time.  This heterogeneity across agents and 
time will be used later.  Under standard assumptions used in discrete choice theory (BD(2001)), the 
probability that agent i chooses +1 in period t is given by, 
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where the parameter "b" scales linearly as the  inverse  of  the  standard  deviation  of  n (Anderson, 
de Palma,  and  Thisse  (1992),  hereafter  ADT(1992)).   That is,  "b" increases to infinity as the 
standard deviation of n goes to zero.  We call "b" the "intensity of choice".  Notice that the function  
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is increasing in x, is 1/2 at x=0 for all b, is 1/2 for b=0  independently  of x, and has a sharp 
threshold at x=0 for huge positive values of b.  To put it another way as b increases from zero to 
infinity the function ƒ(x,b) goes from a horizontal line at 1/2 to a function that is zero for x<0, 1/2 at  
x=0,  one for x>0.  That is, as the intensity of choice increases from zero to infinity the probability 
that agent i chooses +1 when hi(t)>0, (+1 is the "best") goes  to unity as b goes to infinity.   
Equations (2a,2b) give a convenient way to model increasing precision in  choice  as the random 
variability of an agent's preferences decreases.   We shall see that the interaction between peer 
effects and precision of choice creates interesting social dynamics. 
            Let us illustrate how this type of model works by using the example of scientific paradigms  
(Brock  and  Durlauf  (1999)).  In order to minimize notation, let v(+1), v(-1) denote the systematic 
parts (i.e. the deterministic parts) of the utilities or values imputed by each scientist  to  theory  +1 
and theory -1 respectively.  Assume these systematic values are the same for all scientists.   
Represent the peer effect of the scientific community by the following formulation, 
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and  {} 1 , 1 , − + ∈ ω t i  is the actual choice of agent i at date t and a(t) is the average choice of the group 
at time t.    7
Now "C" represents the cost to a scientist who deviates from the paradigm currently held by 
most of the scientific community.   This cost is well known to any scientist who has tried to publish 
a paper in a journal whose editors follow the entrenched paradigm. Similarly Courtney Brown 
(1995) discussed the role of such peer effects in creating non-linearities in changes of voters' 
feelings towards candidates.  
Another important related example arises in modeling party discipline and party loyalty in 
legislative voting.  The cost  "C" represents the cost to a legislator from deviating from the party 
line  (which is represented by the average "a" here) on a particular piece of legislation. This cost 
could be imposed by the party leadership. The parameter "b" captures the intensity of the 
representative's position on the issue, for (+1) or against,  (-1) a particular piece of legislation 
whereas the deterministic part, hi,t  captures the systematic part of  the  representative's preferences.  
For example "b" could be quite large for a prominent issue about which the constituency cares 
greatly but "b" could be quite small for issues that are of little moment to voters or on which the 
constituency is evenly divided. Here, peer effects induced by party discipline dynamically 
interacting with issue dispersion within legislative districts could cause a legislature to exhibit 
punctuated behavior much like a scientific paradigm shift. 
       Let us reiterate the meaning of (2.3) and  (2.4) in the context of scientific theory choice.  
The  "systematic" difference in "utility" to scientist i at date t between theory +1 and theory  -1 is 
the difference in v's adjusted for a peer effect where the scientist is "punished" for deviating from 
the average choice (2.4) of the scientific community.   For example if most of the scientists are 
choosing theory  -1, the peer effect punishes scientist i for choosing theory +1.  In this case scientist 
i will have to prefer theory +1 quite strongly to pay the price of breaking away from the scientific 
consensus. This peer effect creates a consensus that  "tightens" as the intensity of choice b increases 
towards perfect precision of choice, i.e., as b increases towards infinity. High values of b create 
"social  traps"  and historical "path dependence" even when the peer effect C is  small and even  
when theory -1 is inferior to theory +1. A decrease in value of b can "open" the basin of attraction 
of a bad outcome and allow the dynamical system to "escape" such a bad basin of attraction. Here,  
the  basin  of attraction of a stable state of a dynamical system is the set of  all  initial conditions 
that carries the dynamical system's action to  that  stable  state.  We shall develop these ideas 
below.   8
       There are several leading ways to formulate the dynamics of choice from this point on.  A 
first way is to assume that each agent i forms expectations about the average choice a(t), call it, 
a(i,t) and chooses action according to 
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As before, the individual's likely choice will depend on his or her assessment of total value, which 
includes a peer effect estimated on the basis of the individual's expectations regarding the 
consensus position.   This raises the issue of how to model the dynamics of expectation formation 
of a(i,t) for each agent.  Some simple cases are 
 
(2.6)  ai(t)=a(t-1)+φai(t-1) (adaptive expectations), 0<φ<1) 
 
(2.7)  ai(t)=a(t) (perfect foresight). 
 
Let us illustrate by assuming hi(t)=h for all  agents  i  and  for  all  time periods t.  Assume 
expectations of all agents about the average behavior of the community are given by (2.6) with 
 
(2.8)  ai(t)=a(t-1). 
 
That is, every agent i expects the community-wide average chosen next period to be the same as it 
was last period.  Then, except for random variation resulting from very small communities, 
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Call the difference  
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the"net choice for +1".  If the net choice is unity, all are choosing +1; if the net choice is zero, then 
1/2 are choosing +1 and 1/2 are choosing  -1; if the net choice is -1, all are choosing  -1.   In the 
science theory choice context equation  (2.9) says that the net choice in period  t is deterministically 
related to the net choice in period t-1, i.e. 
 
(2.12)   () C h b t a g t a , , ); 1 ( ) ( − =  
 
for the deterministic function g given by (2.9) above.   The equation  (2.12) has been written using 
notation that draws attention on the role of the three key parameters, the intensity of choice b, the 
difference in the systematic parts of the utilities, h, and the size of the peer effect, C.   These three 
parameters determine the "shape" of the function g(a(t-1);b,h,C) as a  function  of a.   
       The graph of g, Figure 1 below, depicts the function g and shows how the shape of the 
function changes as the key parameters change.   Notice how the graphed function looks like a low 
sloping grade for small values of b and C but assumes a steeper grade as b and C increase and 
finally becomes a sharp "cliff" as b and C become very large.  It is this behavior that generates the 

















       System (2.12) is a simple deterministic difference equation to analyze.  The function g 
increases as a(t-1) increases for all positive values of b.  An increase in h shifts the function up and 
this generates a bias towards +1 as h becomes positive and increases.  If there is no bias, i.e. h=0, 
an increase in b "twists" the function around the value zero and it becomes a sharp threshold 
increase from -1 to +1 as a(t-1) moves from negative to positive no matter how small a move it  
makes.   Also note that if b=0, g(a;0,h,C)=0 for all a's so (2.12) just stays at the fixed point a(t)=0 
and the net choice is always zero.  This makes sense: on the one hand, if each agent simply 
randomizes over the choices -1,+1 with no bias towards either  of them, one would expect the 
system  to settle quickly to a community net choice of zero, i.e. 1/2 of them choosing -1, 1/2 of 
them choosing +1; on the  other hand if choice is extremely precise, i.e. b is huge and positive, then 
even  a tiny amount of peer pressure, C>0, can create "social traps" at  both  -1  and  
+1, even when h is positive.  For example, if a(t-1) is near -1, and  
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the system remains "stuck" at a point near -1 at date  t,  if  a(t-1)<0,  even though choice +1 is 
preferred because h>0. 
       If the community size N is very small there is randomness in the behavior of the community 
wide net choice a(t) that we have ignored.  As the community size increases then the Law of Large 
Numbers asserts that the deterministic system we studied above becomes a good approximation.
vi   
The system's behavior can be very different if the group average is treated as a random variable, 
which  it  is  in  reality. More will be said about this difference later. As we illustrated above, the 
dynamics of a(t) given by equation  (2.12)  above  can display alternative stable states which are 
"sticky" in the sense that once in a stable state, it is difficult to escape.  We sum up the discussion at 
this point into 
 
Result 2.1:  Let group size N  become increasingly large.   At each moment the average choice, a(t) 
satisfies (2.12) if at each date t, each member of the group expects that  ai(t)=a(t-1).  If the group 
holds rational point expectations, meaning that they all share the same forecast of next period's a(t) 
and it turns out to be  correct,  then all rational point expectations must satisfy the equation, 
 
(2.12.RE)  a*=g(a*;b,h,C), over all time periods. 
 
This stable solution is unique if bC is small enough and it is one of two (locally stable) solutions of 
equation  (2.12.RE) if the absolute value of h, |h| is small enough and bC exceeds a threshold value.  
It also is unique if |h| is large enough.  This result is obvious as can be seen by looking at Figure 2 
below, which plots the function g(x;b,h,C)  as  a  function  of  x.   Note  the  following properties:  
 
(i) the function g(x;b,h,C) increases in  x  first  at  an  increasing  rate  then at a decreasing rate for 
all values of b, h, C;  
 
(ii) function g(x;b,h,C) is zero at b=0 for all values of h,C;  
(iii)  at infinite b, for h=0, function g(x;b,h,C) is minus one for negative x, is equal to zero for x=0 
and is unity for x positive. Thus, Figure 2 shows that for h=0 the function crosses the 45degree line 
at three points when b is large enough.     12
Figure 2 
      
Therefore, if bC is large enough, there are alternative stable states for the difference equation 
(2.12) when h is close enough to zero. Consider the following example. Suppose h has been 
negative at a constant value for a while so that the current equilibrium is negative.  Let now h=ht  
gradually increase, becoming zero for the first time at time t* and continuing to increase for  t>t*.  
The social optimum is for a switch to occur at t>t*, when the intrinsic value of decision +1 
becomes superior.  But it is easy to see from graphing the dynamics that the system is trapped (for 
the case where bC is large enough) in a negative stable state, in which the option –1 continues to be 
chosen. There are three steady states (i.e. fixed points of the dynamics  (2.12)).   The middle one  
(the locally unstable one) blocks progress towards the socially desirable positive steady state.  See 
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Figure 3 







In the science paradigm case this outcome represents the sluggishness of the scientific 
community in adopting a better paradigm because of peer effects created by the past dominance of 
the old (now inferior) paradigm.  The superiority of the new paradigm h(t) must increase to a rather 
large positive critical value before a "window" is opened up through which the dynamics can 
"escape" the low level "trap" and evolve towards the better choice.  As h continues to increase the 
dynamics now moves rapidly towards the positive alternative stable state.  Once the dynamics is in 
the basin of attraction of the positive steady state, it will stick there even if a new paradigm appears 
to assume the role of +1 and the current newly established paradigm plays the role of -1. This type 
of dynamics requires a big push to get the system out of an historically determined locally stable 
state towards an alternative that is now superior.   
We turn now to a type of dynamics that is not sticky but where the stable states satisfy the 
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Statistical Mechanics and Social “Phase Transitions”: Escape from “Stickiness”  
 
       The second treatment will be less familiar to economists.  It takes into account the fact that 
a(t) is a random variable that induces correlations among the agents' choices because of peer effects 
indicated by C..  Interactions between these correlations and the intensity of choice b produce 
dramatic differences in the dynamics from the system above.   That system assumes that, 
conditional upon expectations of a(t), which  we denoted by ai(t), the choice made by agent i is  
independent  of  other agents’ choices. This assumption ignores the fact that since a(t)  is the 
average of all agents’ choices and a(t) influences each agent’s choice, agents’ choices are therefore 
correlated if their number is  not  large. Modeling this correlation in a tractable way that yields 
Laws of Large Numbers and Central Limit Theorems is a challenge.  One way to do it draws upon 
results in statistics and statistical mechanics.   
       As a consequence, Equation (2.12.RE) will be replaced by a result that gives the same 
equation for the stable states, a* but will lead to different behaviors if there are multiple roots of 
equation (2.11.RE).  If h is not zero the root selected will be the one with the same algebraic sign as 
that of h.  If h is zero a mixture equal to 1/2 times the negative root plus  1/2  times  the  positive  
root  will  be selected.  Therefore, if h changes sign (no matter how small its absolute value) there 
will be an abrupt and truly discontinuous change that we shall call a social phase transition, using 
the language of statistical mechanics.  Modeling such a system will provide a sharp definition of a 
social discontinuity that contrasts with an escape from the attraction basin of an alternative stable 
state, as modeled in the initial system.   Some mathematical notation is needed to state and explain 
this result.  Less mathematically inclined readers can just skip to the following verbal explanation.   
 
3.  Minimal Models of Social Choice Dynamics: Social Phase Transitions 
 
     We can focus attention on a single point in time and drop "t" from the notation in order to 
simplify it.  Then, we formulate a probability model: 
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(3.3)  Z= a normalization factor  
 
that makes the sum of P over all 2
N configurations of  the N agent’s choices between +1 and -1 
equal to unity, as required in a probability distribution. Equation (3.1) represents the probability of 
the particular social configuration of agents’ choices ( ) ) ( ),..., 2 ( ), 1 ( N ω ω ω . Since each agent has 
two choices, -1 or +1 and there are N agents, there are 2
N of these possible configurations. As 
before,  ()
2 * ) ( a i C − ω represents the “punishment” for deviating from the group average.  However, 
now a*  is  the random variable given in (3.2) instead of a  deterministic  belief  about  the large 
system value of the group average assumed in Section 2.  The quantity U should be regarded as a 
systematic part of the utility of the group, rather like that of a social planner acting for the group as 
a whole  (Brock  and  Durlauf (2001a)).  The intensity of choice "b" now refers to the random part 
of group preferences instead of the random part of preferences of each individual agent as in 
Section 2.  As we shall see below the system (3.1), (3.2) generates very different behavior as N 
increases even though the equation for the limiting behavior of the average is unchanged from that 
in Section 2. Consider the simplest case of no heterogeneity in preferences, i.e., 
 
(3.4)  hi=h, for all i=1,2,...,N. 
 
Since 1
2 = ω  a little algebra can transform (3.1) into the form, 
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where the normalization factor has changed but we still call it  Z  and  J=2C.   
It turns out that the limiting value of the group average, "a", satisfies, 
   16
(3.6)  a=g(a,b,h,2J), 
 
where g is the same function as in (2.12) above, and where the starred solution a* is the solution of 
(3.6) with the same sign as h when there is a choice of multiple solutions of (3.6).   
       The reason why the quantity "2J" appears in (3.6) instead of  "J" as in (2.12.RE) is because 
(3.1)  and (3.5) takes into account  the  fact that each agent i impacts all other agents and each of 
those other agents also impacts i.  The model considered in (2.12.RE) is like a non-cooperative 
game in which each agent only takes into account the impact of the other agents upon his or her 
decision.  Hence a "2" appears in (3.1) and  (3.5).
vii 
          It  turns  out  that  the  correct  choice among solutions that satisfy  (3.6) is the one that 
maximizes the limiting "inclusive value" per capita (BD(2001a, p. 257)). This is defined by 
v(N)=V(N)/N,  where  () ( ) {} ω ≡ U E N V max , the maximum expected utility over all social 
configurations. This is the discrete choice analog of the usual net benefit per capita of conventional 
welfare analysis (ADT  (1992),  BD  (2001a)).   In the discrete choice case, randomness adds a new 
term to inclusive value. Inclusive value collapses to the conventional welfare measure when the 
intensity of choice, "b," is infinite, since then choices correspond to the conventional deterministic 
case. 
       For  bJ>1 the limiting inclusive value per capita has two local maxima. The global 
maximum shifts from the negative one to the positive one as h passes through zero from negative to 
positive.  This corresponds to a dramatic change in dynamic behavior from the case in Section 2 
above. In this present case there will be a sharp discontinuity in group behavior.   We summarize 
the discussion up to this point by stating 
 
Result 3.1:  Let bJ>1 and let h≡h(t) slowly increase from negative to positive as t increases.  That 
is, suppose h(t)<0, for  t<t* and  h(t)>0,  for  t>t*.  Then a*(t) is the negative solution of (3.6) for 
t<t*, and a*(t) jumps to the positive solution of (3.6) for t>t*.  Hence, for the case bJ>1, the group 
consensus choice jumps discontinuously from the smallest solution of  (3.6) to the largest solution 
of (3.6) the moment h passes from negative to positive.  Similarly, if h slowly decreased from 
positive to negative there would be a discontinuous drop from the largest solution of (3.6) to the 
smallest solution of (3.6).  In the case bJ<1 there is only one solution of (3.6) and no such 
discontinuity in the dynamics appears as h passes from negative to positive or vice versa.     17
In terms of the scientific paradigm example, this implies that as soon as the new paradigm 
had overtaken the older one in terms of its perceived intrinsic merit, the scientific community 
would immediately shift to a new strong consensus in its favor. This behavior contrasts sharply 
with the behavior in the initial model even in the case of rational expectations.  In that case, a*(t) is 
stuck at a negative solution of (3.6) until h(t), the perceived intrinsic merit, becomes so large and  
positive at time t** that the graph of (3.6) is lifted high enough so that the middle solution of (3.6) 
disappears to open a "window" so  the  dynamics  (3.6)  can  "tunnel  through" towards the 
desirable positive solution.  See Figure 4 below. To put it another way the "dead hand" of history 
lies heavily on the dynamics in Result 2.1 but the dynamics of Result 3.1 escapes the "dead hand" 
of history and are able to react immediately to what is socially optimum currently. We call 
dynamics of Result 2.1, "mean field" dynamics because these dynamics result from agents forming 
point expectations of the system-wide average, which is really a random variable.  Point 
expectation formation shuts off the correlations in the Result 3.1 dynamics so the phase transition 
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Figure 4 







       What is the source of the dramatic difference between Result 3.1 and Result 2.1?  The 
easiest way to understand this difference is to recall that the correct choice of the solutions that 
satisfy (3.6) is the one maximizing a function that appears when computing the limiting "inclusive 
value" per capita (BD(2001a, p. 257)).  Call that function W({Hi(t)},x;b,J)  the limiting inclusive  
value  per  capita. Here x represents variable values of a, the group average. Consider the simplest 
case, in which Hi(t)≡h for all agents for all dates and W≡W(h,x;b,J).  The function W has multiple 
local maxima in x when bJ>1.   The limiting value of the average choice of the community, namely 
a*, is the global maximum of W.   When Hi(t)≡h=0 for all agents, and bJ>1, the limiting inclusive 
value per capita, W(0,x;b,J), has two global maxima, one positive and one negative.   The limiting 
value of a* is a mixture with 1/2 of the mass on each of the two global  maxima.  When Hi(t)≡h 
becomes slightly positive, the positive global maximum value of W is slightly bigger than the 
negative one, so the limit value a* "leaps" from the mixture to putting all mass onto this positive 
and unique global  maximum.  If "h" now becomes slightly negative, the new global maximum is 
the negative one, so a* "drops" discontinuously to the negative one.   
h(t=0) 
h(t=t**)  19
       One can imagine an undulating surface with two local maxima, the larger of which always 












The correlation among agent’s choices can lead to rapid shifts in response to changes in 
underlying “fundamentals”, whereas Result 2.1 works more like a non-cooperative game that can 
get stuck in a bad equilibrium or in a good equilibrium. However, if parameters such as b or C 
slowly diminish so that the Result 2.1 system moves to a configuration that has only one 
equilibrium position, then rapid change can occur when multiple equilibria are replaced by a unique 
equilibrium. 
       How might one be able to apply these concepts to detect such an impending "tip" in the 
field?  How might one be able to detect in practice the difference between a process governed by 
Result 2.1 and one governed by Result 3.1? . Also, could one use these results to help predict an 







These questions are very hard.
viii Attempting to predict a tipping point is rather like a doctor 
attempting to predict the exact moment a patient in bad cardiac health will have a heart attack. She 
can only indicate that the patient has characteristics that suggest a heart attack will happen with 
high probability.  She cannot say exactly when it will happen.   
       Result  (3.1) suggests potential routes to making a social system more nimble and less sticky 
by strengthening the correlations amongst agents’ actions
ix. This amounts to increasing positive 
feedbacks, either by reducing random variability in agents’ choices or by increasing penalties for 
deviation. .  In principle, the strength of a positive feedback loop like that induced by a large value 
of "C" in our model could be measured by survey methods designed to elicit from agents how much 
they feel that they would be punished if they deviated from the group average.  We will say more 
about the use of our type of modeling in an attempt to link observable quantities to impending rapid 
shifts below.   
Turn now, however, to another result that will probably not be familiar to social scientists. 
Social scientists are familiar with normal distributions.  Most social scientists are familiar with 
Central Limit Theorems that show that a normal distribution is the limit for appropriately scaled 
sums of random variables.  But in settings like Result 3.1, limiting distributions with “fatter” tails 
than normal will sometimes emerge. Baumgartner’s paper in this volume provides empirical 
support for this proposition, finding that extreme environmental policy events occur more 
frequently than would “normally” be expected. 
   We have, 
 
Result 3.2 (Adapted from Amaro de Matos and Perez (1991)): Assume that bJ>1 and that the 
variance of the distribution of {hi} across agents is finite for each date t.  We omit t in the notation 
















Here the random variable X is distributed as a mixture of normal distributions and the quantity a* 
maximizes an inclusive value expression analogous to that in the case where all h's are the same.     21
The limiting behavior of this normalized sum of deviations from the mean is "unconventional" for 
the case bJ>1.  A very small peer effect C can interact with a large intensity of choice to make bJ>1 
so not only does the "leaping" behavior of Result 3.1 emerge but also the unusual limit distribution 
of normalized sums. This limit distribution has fatter tails than the normal distribution, implying 
that extreme events are more frequent than would “normally” be expected.  This result may lurk 
behind the common observation in social sciences of large variation in behavior across measurably 
similar communities and social groups.  However, if bJ<1, the limit distribution X is normally 
distributed.        
 
Effects of Slow Dynamics of {hi(t)}, b, J. 
 
       Results (2.1) and Results (3.1), (3.2) shed light on what can happen as the result of gradual 
changes in {hi(t)},b,J}. Recall that "b" measures the intensity of choice.  A common strategy in 
policy debates appears to be one that lowers b and biases the h's away from the "truth" by sowing 
confusion about the issue and making false claims. For example, in the evolution of understanding 
of lake eutrophication and of the role played by phosphorous, "scientists" working for special 
interests muddied the waters by trying to direct attention towards other superficially plausible 
alternative causes.   
       We can model this activity as a special interest group induced decrease in "b" as well as an 
induced bias in the distribution of h.  Clearly, if such activity keeps bJ<1 and h<1, social action 
towards the desirable equilibrium will not crystallize and there will not be a phase transition like 
that of Result 3.1 to escape from a low level equilibrium trap created because the system is in the 
basin of attraction of an inferior but locally stable steady state. To put it another way, "b" is high 
when "transparency" of understanding of an issue is high.  Transparency can be muddled and 
decreased by "junk science" funded by special interest groups, which, if successful, can create 
policy inertia. This seems to have happened on the issue of global warming, as suggested by the 
Lane paper in this volume, particularly because the effects of climate change remain mostly in the 
future and hence are not self-evident to non-scientists.  
On the other hand, transparency can be increased through dynamic and forceful scientific 
leadership and public education campaigns to clear away junk science and illuminate good science.  
Reputable scientific organizations like the National Academy of Sciences can play a major role in   22
increasing "b" as well as removing bias in {hi(t)} provided they  can get their message through the 
fog of commercial media.  Public media such as National Public Radio and the Public Broadcasting  
System  can play a key role here. 
       If "b" is very large, a very small amount of peer pressure (induced perhaps just by people 
communicating through their social networks) can cause bJ to be larger than unity. Politicians have 
begun using the Internet extensively to promote interactions among their “base” constituency in 
order to reinforce their support. This cuts both ways. Notice that bJ>1 helps the system jump 
quickly to the current social optimum in the case of Result 3.1's dynamics, but it can hurt the 
welfare properties of the system's dynamics by making them sticky at the inferior basin of 
attraction due to history (path) dependence in the case of the dynamics of Result 2.1.  
     Models of changing correlations that generate phase transitions rather than “mean field" 
models may better represent situations where conditional independence is replaced by dependence.   
Dependence can be created by "leaders" (which could be media coverage rather than individual 
activists or policy entrepreneurs) who are exceptionally persuasive to individual agents i=1,2,...,N  
and,  hence, are effective in coordinating their actions. Probability models of the form (3.1) and 
(3.2) are a useful way of capturing the effect of such leaders in inducing or increasing correlations 
amongst individual choices as well as their effect in increasing "transparency" (which can be 
modeled as increasing the "intensity" or "precision" of choice parameterized by "b" here). The 
implication is that effective leaders may be able to bring about rapid and discontinuous, even 
revolutionary, phase transitions.     
       Reality is probably better presented by a combination of models which yield the same set of 
roots but have some probability "p" of being able to jump across a negative basin of attraction to a 
positive one as h changes from negative to positive, where changes in p affects the degree of 
stickiness.  For example, p=0 could represent the dynamics of Result 2.1 and p=1 could represent 
Result 3.1.
x 
 Of course, what is important is not an abstract device like that but what such modeling can 
teach us about reality. What evidence would reveal that a particular social process is more like 
Result 2.1 than Result 3.1?  In the former, each agent acts independently, after forming an 
expectation about what the group will do and the resulting peer effect on her, with the expectations 
being fulfilled in equilibrium. In the latter, the process unfolds as if some mechanism chose the 
configuration of group actions that optimized group welfare, respecting each agent's own objective   23
but penalizing her deviation from the group average.  In both cases there may be multiple equilibria 
but in the former, no mechanism is assumed that would lead to the best one.  
       What  observable  indicators  or  signatures might tell us which dynamic is actually 
operating? One approach mentioned above is to look for direct evidence from surveys that ask 
people whether they have incentives to choose actions being chosen by others in the group and 
whether those incentives would change if the group chose opposite actions.  A second is to look for 
indirect evidence such as observations of large variation of group outcomes across groups that seem 
homogeneous with respect to relevant characteristics 
 Possibly, we might expect a dynamic like Result 3.1 to operate in situations where a leader 
can coordinate the preponderance of agents onto the best equilibrium but a dynamic more like 
Result 2.1 in situations where factional leaders compete or where no one or nothing plays the role 
of coordinator.  
           We  are  now  ready  to  ask  what  insights these models can offer in understanding the 
punctuated policy equilibrium phenomena discussed by Baumgartner (2003) and in building 
models that illuminate what Jones, Baumgartner,and True (2002), JBT (2002), call policy macro-
punctuations. For example, JBT (2002) use a large data set for U.S. government budgetary changes 
to show that 
 
(i) There are "a limited number of distinct macro-punctuations in government budgeting that 
respond to a combination of external shocks and internal dynamics." 
 
(ii) There is "a pattern of punctuations that cannot be explained by typical political and economic 
factors: partisan control, public opinion, and economic growth." 
 
(iii) There is "considerable year-to-year volatility in the funding of government programs even in 
the absence of macro-punctuations." 
 
(iv) There is "a substantial and distinct decline in budget volatility in the post-war period." 
 
       Suppose we model action on a particular item in the federal budget as  -1 for the status quo 
and +1 for a change away from the status quo and let Hi(t) denote the difference in preference for   24
legislator  i for this particular  item at date t.  Our first type of model (Result 2.1) produces 
alternative stable states by the internal dynamics produced by penalties from deviating from the 
group position.  The same dynamics can result if one legislator’s benefit is increased when more 
other legislators take the same action.  Since both mechanisms produce positive feedbacks, it is not 
surprising that they generate similar results. In general, similar dynamic phenomena can be 
expected in diverse settings where forces of conformity or complementarity are present.  If such 
forces are strong enough and the intensity of choice is high enough so that the product, bJ, crosses a 
threshold, the status quo for the particular budgetary item or particular policy issue would prevail, 
unless the preference Hi(t) changes dramatically away from the status quo for many legislators at 
the same time.  Since such an event would be rare, macro-punctuations would occur infrequently.   
     Consider finding (ii) above. The internal dynamics caused by bJ>1 in our model tells us 
that there will be times when the status quo has been protected by negative feedback forces of 
conformity or complementarity, even as Hi(t) trends up away  from  the  status  quo  for  a 
substantial number of legislators.  Result 2.1 suggests that occasionally (possibly quite rarely) the 
basin of attraction of the smaller stable state, maintaining the status quo, is escaped by the dynamic 
process, at which point a macro-punctuation would ensue that might appear inexplicable by the 
policy "fundamentals" listed in finding  (ii).    
       Public opinion, “policy learning” or economic change might affect the preferences Hi(t) of 
each legislator but it might surprise an observer to see the legislature respond dramatically, i.e. a 
macro-punctuated  response, to  a seemingly small additional change in the Hi(t), as the U.S 
Congress did in dropping the ITQ moratorium, as recounted in the Repetto & Allen chapter. But the 
interaction between internal dynamics caused by conformity/complementarity effects together with 
external changes "driving" the system can produce these dynamics.  Slow moving variables, 
whether social, economic or demographic, may drive the values of the Hi(t) to a point where some 
kind of "threshold" is crossed.  
     Baumgartner    (2003)  discusses  the  following empirical signatures consistent with 
complex dynamics in policymaking processes: 
 
(i) The tone of media coverage of pesticides trended from mostly positive to distinctly negative, 
with a rather sharp drop in the 1950's when an upward trend in total coverage occurred.   
   25
(ii) Budgetary changes in the U.S. Federal budget over the period 1947-2000 have thicker tails than 
a normal distribution would.  
 
(iii) In a sample of issues in 1996 Baumgarter's team found that the number of lobbyists is highly 
skewed across issues, with one single issue occupying 17 percent of lobbyists. 
 
(iv) The number of anti-death penalty stories showed no trend over the period 1960-1998 but 
jumped abruptly up in 1999. 
 
All such phenomena could be generated by appropriately parameterized versions of our 
models. Although it would be a full research project to build models that fully explain the findings 
of teams such as Baumgartner's in policy science, we hope to have said enough to indicate the 
potential usefulness of the kind of modeling presented in this chapter.   
 
4.  Concentrated Special Interest Groups Versus Diffuse Groups 
 
          Next, models are presented that focus on the structure of social interaction within groups in 
producing pressure on policy makers and political systems. The models discussed above are much 
too simple. Most policy changes produce losers and winners but the initial models only had one 
group, winners, and the models explained how the system could get stuck in an inferior 
equilibrium.  The goal was to identify leverage points for actions to tip the system out of a bad 
equilibrium towards the better equilibrium.   
       The much harder and more important problem is to model the problem of inducing policy 
change when the benefits to change outweigh the losses but the losers are better organized for 
collective action than the winners.
xi Fortunately, the simple binary discrete choice models 
introduced above can still be used to model the movement of an agent i from a state of  "latency" 
(which we denote by -1) to "entering the game" (which we will denote by +1). This leads to a "two 
stage" game in which the first stage is the decision whether or not to enter the game and the second 
stage is the choice of the magnitude of effort to expend after entry.  The goal will be to understand 
the ability of concentrated special interest groups to mobilize action and to deliver more action than 
diffuse groups.   26
 
  Definition 4.1:  A special interest group is a group that is proposing to use or is currently using 
the government to obtain a benefit, B where the cost to the whole society of giving this benefit is 
C>B.. 
 
Examples include:  (i) tariffs, export subsidies and other "protective" measures, where the cost of 
such benefits to the public is greater than the benefits received by the industries sheltered from 
competition; (ii) subsidies to agricultural interests, where the costs to the public exceed the value of 
the agricultural subsidies; (iii) the assignment of water "rights" to agricultural interests whose water 
uses are less valuable than alternative uses (Milgrom and Roberts (1992), Chapter 9); (iv) grazing 
rights and timber concessions on  public lands awarded at subsidized rates, reducing public 
revenues and increasing ecological damages.  The general pattern   is that of “rent-seeking 
behavior”, wherein one group use the political system not only to take resources from the rest of 
society but also, in many cases, to impose deadweight losses on others that may even be larger than 
the value of the resources they capture. 
       Suppose  we  define  politics  as  authoritative allocation of value and economics as 
competitive allocation of value.  A common interest group mustering political pressure faces the 
same structural problem as a group mustering the power to police its jointly owned common 
property or any group organizing to provide a commonly supplied local public good for itself.  A 
key problem is that the group must be able to police free riders effectively to ensure that each 
member contributes to the joint effort. The superior ability of concentrated groups to wield political 
power might be due, for example, to characteristics of their livelihoods that enable them to organize 
more effectively, to police free riders and to muster resources to pressure the political system: 
Members of the group might in a repeated economic relationship with fellow members.  For 
example, local lobster fishermen deliver to the same markets, share the same docks and work the 
same coastline. Also, members of the group might need access to a common joint factor of 
production for which there are no close substitutes.  For example, surgeons need access to 
operating rooms at the local hospitals and the good will of fellow physicians for referrals. Real 
estate agents need access to the formal network of the Multiple Listing Service as well as their 
informal network (aka "social  capital").      27
This rent-seeking dilemma has much the same analytical structure as the prisoner's dilemma 
studied by Axelrod (1984), (1997).
xii Organizing a political pressure group is structurally similar to 
self-organizing a group to provide a public good for the group use or to manage a common property 
resource.  Ostrom's (1990) message is that, contrary to the metaphor of the "tragedy of the 
commons", many groups have successfully self-organized workable management of their commons 
without the intervention of a central authority. This optimistic message that groups can and do self-
organize to solve commons problems implies that special interest groups are also able to solve their 
own "commons problem" of self-organizing and applying political pressure to capture authoritative 
allocations of value. The general finding is this: groups that are compact, homogeneous, and whose 
actions are internally transparent tend to get political benefits that are less than their cost to the 
diffusely organized public. Therefore, only such groups are defined as "special interest groups."   
              Ostrom identified group characteristics that help predict the likelihood of successful 
self- organization:   
(i) Groups self-organize best to manage common property resources (CPR) when  they  can  (1)  
define  access conditions, (2)  regulate  appropriation  in  terms  of  quantity,  space,  or technology, 
(3) monitor and enforce these rules, and (4) "...when boundary, authority, monitoring, and 
sanctioning  rules are defined and enforced internally, the outcomes are likely to be more efficient 
than those achieved when the rules are imposed externally". (OGW (1994, p. 316)). 
(ii) CPR problems are easier to solve when "the costs of obtaining relevant information about both 
the resource facility and the flow of resource units are relatively low in comparison with the 
benefits that can be achieved through successful institutional design." (OGW (1994, p. 316)). 
(iii) "Simply allowing individuals to talk together is change enough in the decision-making 
environment to alter behavior substantially, even though promises made without external enforcers 
are theoretically considered to be irrelevant." (OGW (1994, p. 320)).    
(iv) Repeated interaction in the expectation of mutual trust assists in overcoming "social dilemmas" 
(OGW (1994, p. 328)). 
(v) No use of trigger strategies, such as “tit for tat”, is observed in either the field or the lab, 
contrary to conclusions of many repeated-game models of the resolution of social dilemmas (OGW 
(1994, p.301). 
       A simple way to analyze the contest between concentrated versus diffuse groups is to use 
"action supply functions" on both sides of the struggle.
xiii Consider two groups, "gainers"  (group 1)   28
and "losers" (group 2) who supply pressure on the political system for and against policy at level 
T(t-1) at date t according to 
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(4.2)   () ( ) B A t X t Y t T t C G t y j j j j , ); ( 2 ), ( 2 , ) 1 ( ; ) ( − =  
 
where xi(t) and yj(t)  are individual contributions by gainer i and  loser  j at date t, Si(t;T(t-1)). 
Cj(t;T(t-1)) are gains and losses to gainer  i  and loser j when policy is set at level T(t-1). Also, 
X1i(t), Y1j(t) are member i’s expectations regarding total contributions by the rest of group 1 and 
expectations of i regarding total contributions in group 2. Similar interpretation holds for Y2 and 
X2.  Furthermore, a, b and A, B denote effectiveness and noticeability parameters perceived by 
individual members of groups 1 and 2.  Here, a member’s contribution F is assumed to increase 
with the payoff S, increase with the expected contribution of other group members X1, and decrease 
with expected competing contributions Y1.  F is also assumed to increase with effectiveness a and 
noticeability b even if S is small relative to the cost of individual effort for i. This last assumption 
captures the idea of "noticeability" of i by other members of the group.  Similar properties hold for 
G.  Assume that
xiv 
 






















t T t S t x
i
i i  
 


























t T t C t y
j
j j . 
 
 
If one solves for Nash non-cooperative equilibrium to get reduced form supply functions, 
then for a plausible set of game theoretic structures, it will be true that   
(i) If the total stakes for one side increase, that side applies more pressure.    29
(ii) If the total stakes on one side remain constant but its distribution among the group’s members 
becomes more unequal (more concentrated), then that side applies more pressure.   
       This analysis can be easily extended to include cases where there is a slow moving variable, 
such as a slow erosion of political power by one side of the struggle. The predicted result can be an 
abrupt change in the outcome, related to shifts in the relative contributions of contending groups. 
This may be hard to link to observable "fundamentals", much like the "surprises" caused by a slow 
moving variable in previous models. Empirical work in this area has had mixed success due to the 
presence of many confounding events and political forces that make it difficult to isolate the effects 
of interest group pressure on the political outcome.  
       Building on the previous assumptions, the political system is assumed to choose the policy 
outcome T(t) according to 
 









) ( ) (
i





) ( ) (
N
j
j t y t Y , 
Here the function P is assumed to increase in T(t-1) and X(t) and decrease  in Y(t). That is, the 
policy outcome is influenced by the magnitude of contributions of the two contending sides but 
there is an in-built momentum to policy decisions. 
       Assume that payoffs S and C are equal across all i and j respectively, assume rational point 
expectations and use (4.1'), (4.2') to obtain 
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Social welfare at t is given by 
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which we assume is optimal at T=0.   Make the natural assumption that S(0)=C(0)=W(0)=0.  We 
obtain via substitution a "reduced form" dynamic equation for the time path of policy outcomes, 
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     Even though this formulation is simple, it is useful for focusing attention on what forces impede 
optimum policies. Optimal policy is T*(t)=0 for all t.  Bad policy is positive T.   We are interested 
in locating conditions for (a) emergence of bad policy from a baseline of zero, (b) eliminating bad 
policy once entrenched.  They are:  
 
(i) Good policy, T*=0, is an equilibrium state. However, the equilibrium is unstable, leading to bad 
outcomes, if F'(0)>1.  Then, whenever T(0)>0, no matter how trivially, the dynamic moves T(t) 
toward increasingly bad outcomes. The optimum is locally stable if |F'(0)|<1 
 
(ii) Assume F'(0)>1 and F'>0 for all  T. In order to prevent policy outcomes to become indefinitely 
worse once a single error is made, T(0)>0, F'<1 must hold for large enough  T.  It is plausible to 
assume that this is true because if special interest distortions became large enough, the incumbents 
would be positioned so far away from the median voter that it would be easy for challengers to 
attack them.   This would eventually hold true even taking into account the well- known incumbent 
advantage in U.S. electoral contests.  Therefore we assume F'(T)<1 for T large enough.  Hence if 
F'(0)>1, there will probably be at least one locally stable equilibrium T*>0.  
 
(iii) Consider an industry seeking a protective tariff T against imports.  Because tariffs cause 
deadweight losses, S(T)<C(T), the costs outweigh the benefits, so the socially optimal tariff is T=0.  
Then why are there tariffs? Typically, the consumer group is very large with small losses for each 
household so the noticeability coefficient "B" is plausibly zero for the consumer side.  For example,   31
no consumer is ever punished for failing to lobby against a sugar tariff that raises prices on all 
goods containing sweeteners. Free rider problems loom very large for large diffuse groups, so the 
"perceived effectiveness" coefficient "A" is also plausibly zero.  Hence, no lobbying against the 
tariff comes from the consumer side.   
            Things are quite different on the producer side. Not only is the producer group much 
smaller but the gains per firm are also much larger, as are the gains to worker from jobs at the 
producers' factories that might be lost without protection against imports.  Hence, we might expect 
that "peer effects" on the producer side induce contributions from each member; i.e., the 
"noticeability" coefficient "b" is likely to be positive.  We might think of "b" as a representation of 
the effect of the peer group parameter J in the models discussed in Section  2.  Furthermore, the 
"perceived effectiveness" coefficient  "a" is plausibly positive because, although, free rider effects 
will still be present, each factory or union looms large enough relative to the industry that it can be 
expected to perceive some effect of its individual contributions to the group effort. Thus, we expect 
a positive level T* to be a locally stable equilibrium, and we expect T*=0 to be a locally unstable 
equilibrium that must be constrained by international agreements not to re-raise tariffs, once 
lowered. We used the tariff as an expository example because of its classic role in the economic 
analysis of pressure group influence
xv.  This analysis also explains why the only lobbying against 
protective tariffs is actually conducted by opposing industry associations that happen to use the 
imported commodity as a raw material or component. 
       The same analysis can be applied to environmental issues, since the pollution damages are 
spread out over a diffuse  group  of  victims but  the gains from being allowed to pollute are 
received by a concentrated group. In these cases, our analysis predicts more pollution than socially 
optimal.  However, if the damages from pollution are concentrated on a local community and the 
benefits to industrial workers, customers, and shareholders of being able to pollute are diffuse, one 
might even have less pollution than socially optimal. This is the “Not In My Back Yard” (NIMBY) 
problem. One could approach NIMBY problems by allowing communities to "bid" in a 
"Willingness To Accept" auction on compensation levels rather than having the plant sited near 
some politically weak community, as seems often to have been the case.   Although it may be more 
costly to site plants after paying the community enough to induce them willingly to accept the 
plant, that is good because it reveals the true cost of siting "nuisances" and forces consumers of the 
outputs of polluting facilities to pay their full social costs.   32
            Leaving NIMBY problems aside, we focus now on cases where the issue is that well-
organized, concentrated groups use the political system to extract resources (or impose costs) on 
poorly organized, and typically diffuse groups. Several remedies are suggested by our rather trivial  
model: 
 
(a) A heavy burden of proof can be placed on any distortionary policy.  This would make T*=0 a 
locally stable equilibrium and induce a threshold at zero that would have to be crossed before 
the T(t) dynamics could get into the basin of attraction of a locally stable positive steady state 
T*. Already, for example, tariffs are “bound” by international treaties and cannot be raised 
except without penalty except in special temporary circumstances. Omnibus legislation such as 
the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) constrains policy actions by the executive 
branch and subjects it to review. Other environmental legislation, such as FIFRA, prohibits the 
government from allowing new pesticides on the market without safety and risk-benefit studies. 
 
(b) Since the origin of the problem is the imbalance of power between concentrated and diffuse 
groups, steps might be taken to make the former more accountable to the latter. For example, 
corporations could be required to disclose their lobbying activities and positions on public policy 
issues to their shareholders, a much more diffuse group now including more than 43 million 
Americans, and gain prior approval for lobbying activities from a committee comprised of 
independent members of the Board of Directors. 
 
(c) The models focus attention on parameters that determine the relative "social efficacy" of groups 
in solving their collective social action problems. They suggest that creating a level playing field of 
"rules" ensuring that all groups will be equally able to create pressure for and against policy 
changes is key. This implies, for example, that groups on all sides of an issue should be afforded 
adequate opportunities to be heard during legislative or administrative proceedings. Access to 
policymaking processes should not be determined by campaign contributions. 
 
(d) A method sometimes used by group entrepreneurs to control free riding in diffuse groups is to 
offer a joint product consisting of lobbying combined with other desirable goods and services. For 
example, the AARP lobbies, ostensibly on behalf of seniors, and boosts its membership by offering   33
all sorts of discounted services. The Sierra Club does much the same thing with environmentalists.  
Of course, competition among such entrepreneurs for members might induce one to "unbundle" the 
joint product, save money by dropping the expensive lobbying, and offer the services at a cheaper 
price than rival entrepreneurs. Then the free riding problem would re-emerge
xvi.  
 
This model abstracts from the dynamics of the supply of pressure within each group. One 
could apply general theory of social interactions as in Durlauf and Young (2001) and Verbrugge's 
review (2003) to model the dynamics of group supply of political action  (i.e. pressure) on both 
sides of the struggle.  The general outcome of this more sophisticated modeling would probably be 
insights into how the structure of network relationships  "social capital" for a group that helps it to 




       What is the role of "social capital" in allowing a group to solve its collective action 
problem in mustering more political pressure relative to other groups? Social capital is notoriously 
difficult to conceptualize or measure precisely but the group that has more of it will be able to 
muster more political  pressure.
xvii Indeed, inequality across groups in the distribution of social 
capital is a major problem in democratic political systems and is a major reason why poorly 
organized public interests are so severely exploited by well-organized special interests. It also helps 
explains why the political system produces so much deadweight loss that is obvious to economists 
and other social scientists. Indeed, increased political competition can produce results that reduce 
social welfare, unlike increased economic competition. (Colander (1984), MBY (1989)).   
       Consider, for example, state or city governments competing for new investments to generate 
jobs and growth. In each jurisdiction there are concentrated groups who stand to benefit if a project 
is attracted and a diffuse public that pays for the tax give-aways and other subsidies, not to mention 
any other external costs. Therefore, the supply curve in each jurisdiction of incentives for new 
project exceeds the social welfare optimum supply curve. This alone will create "excess 
development" in all such jurisdictions. Examples abound of states that "win" a factory paying many 
times more per new job created than the job pays itself. In such instances, the states could have 
saved lots of money by hiring new workers themselves. How can this be?  Such results can be   34
explained by adding to the political imbalance between special interests and the public in each 
locale the phenomenon of the "winner's curse" and sheer political myopia. 
     The "winner's curse" is that the winning bidder usually pays too much. Decisions on how 
much incentive to offer a potential development are based on economic impact studies that are 
subject to wide margins of uncertainty.  The state that happens to get a high estimate from their 
economic impact study will tend to bid high and, more often than not, will win, though to the 
detriment of its economy.  It is notoriously hard for people to condition out this effect in preparing 
optimal bidding strategies, even for professionals like bidders on oil tracts and timber concessions, 
much less politicians and their staffs. 
       Add to this the force of political myopia, the tendency of politicians to act to get benefits 
now and to push the costs onto the next person's watch, plus the imbalance of political pressure 
within each jurisdiction and one has a sufficient explanation for the widespread destruction of 
America’s environment by uncontrolled development. A t  t h e  r i s k  o f  r e p e tition, the remedy is 
creating institutions that force all cost causers to  pay  the  costs  they  impose  on others.
xviii 
 
5.  Ambiguity Aversion, Peer Effects, and Choice Intensity: A Reason for 
“Irrational” Inertia  
 
      “Ambiguity  aversion”
xix expresses the idea that people react differently when facing 
situations in which objective probabilities cannot be assigned to possible outcomes. One of the 
simplest assumptions regarding such ambiguity is that people assume the worst-case outcome 
within bounds with a width that depends upon their knowledge about the possible outcomes.   
       This idea can be applied social systems like those analyzed in sections 2 and 3 above.  
Suppose that only one choice, -1, has been available for a long time. Let now a new choice, +1, 
appear at date t=0.   Assume that the objective systematic part of the utility difference is h>0, 
implying that the utility generated by choice +1 is objectively better for all members of the 
community. Nevertheless, the intensity of choice, b, the peer effect C, and the level of ambiguity 
can interact to deepen a social trap at -1 and make it harder to escape. Here's the idea.  Suppose first 
that there is no ambiguity aversion. Let choice +1 now appear. If there are no peer effects, the 
difference equation (2.12) above has only one stable state, so it converges from the previous state,  
-1, to a new stable state that will be nearer to +1, the larger is b.  The larger the intensity of choice,   35
the more quickly and closely the community comes to the best choice,  +1.  Now introduce 
ambiguity aversion in the following way: let [h-B,h] be an interval that community members 
believe contains the  possibilities for the systematic utility difference right after the availability of  
the  new choice +1 appears. Assum that each agent hedges against possible mis-specification of the 
systematic part of the gains from moving to +1 by imputing h-B, not h to the net systematic gain.   
This may describe how the emotional part of the brain reacts when facing a new alternative with 
which one has no personal experience, before the rational part of the brain has evaluated some 
accumulated experience. Whatever the explanation, this simple model shows how the intensity of 
choice b can interact with B to create a social trap.   
     If h-B<0 and b is huge and positive, the dynamics, (2.12) is stuck near -1 and never 
escapes even though there are no peer effects. As the intensity of choice decreases, the stable state  
-1 becomes less resilient as its basin of attraction shrinks. Let B be a function B(a(t)) that decreases 
towards zero as a(t) increases from minus one. This could be a type of demonstration effect that 
reassures fearful agents once a few agents choosing +1 have been observed getting h out of that 
choice and not the feared h-B.  Notice that a lower b would generate more experiments, so there are 
more observations of the outcome of choice of  +1 available. This reduces B and causes yet more 
agents to choose +1, creating a positive feedback loop of escape from the bad  choice  -1  as  b  is  
lowered. This process is reminiscent of that described in the Repetto & Allen chapter of 
fishermen’s groups choosing to adopt secure harvesting rights. 
 The reverse effect occurs when b is increasing and the system starts at the historically given 
choice -1.  If b is infinite and h-B(a(0)=-1)<0,  no one ever chooses +1, so no observations of what 
actually happens to an  agent  who made choice +1 is ever available.  In contrast, as b decreases, a 
few agents will happen to choose +1 even though h-B(a(0)=-1)<0.  Then, in the next period B is 
smaller, which makes it more likely that more choices of +1 appear. This positive feedback loop 
that was opened up by a reduction in the intensity of choice creates an avenue of escape from a bad 
social trap. In this context, peer effects just deepen the depth of a social trap because they place an 
extra cost on departures from the existing consensus at  -1. Thus, peer effects cause fewer examples 
of +1 choice to appear and this keeps people fearful of the new choice, so they continue to assume a 
worst-case scenario.
xx   
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This discussion can shed further light on the contest between concentrated special interest 
groups and diffuse public interest groups. Suppose that there a concentrated subgroup stands to lose 
if the community moves away from -1, even though the community as a whole stands to gain from 
a move to +1.   How might this concentrated group use its superior ability to muster resources and 
control free riding within its membership?  It could muster and use resources to increase the size of 
B in the minds of the community, increase the intensity of choice b in the community, and increase 
the magnitude of peer effects C in the community. 
The first strategy could take the form of inducing fear throughout the community by a 
disinformation (or less politely, a misinformation) campaign.  Here is a current example (Table 1) 
that appeared in the Sunday, October 12, 2003 Wisconsin State Journal, entitled "Getting it wrong 
on the Iraq war". 
 
Table 1: "Getting it wrong on the Iraq war", Many Americans have misperceptions about 
key facts.   
Primary news sources for those 
who believe: 
Since the war ended, the U.S. 
has found Iraqi weapons of 
mass destruction 
U.S. has found clear evidence 
that Saddam Hussein was   
working  closely  with al-Qaeda 
terrorist groups 
Fox  33% 67% 
CBS  23% 56% 
NBC  20% 49% 
CNN  20% 48% 
ABC  19% 45% 
P  17% 40% 
P/N  11% 16% 
Note: P denotes "print media" and P/N denotes PBS/NPR.  The WSJ gave the source for this as "PIPA/Knowledge 
Networks Poll of 3,334 adults, June-September, 2003, 1.7 percentage points error margin." 
 
            Since the answer should have been approximately zero percent for the first belief and 
probably close to zero percent for the second belief, this table suggests a clustering at  -1, the 
“wrong” choice, induced by history dependence, peer effects, induced high strength of belief (high   37
choice intensity, "b"), and induced fear of worst-case scenarios (perhaps induced by the 9-11 
horror) amongst different peer groups who adhere to the media sources listed above.  Since each 
group's dominant media source probably induces correlations that help stick the audience on the 
wrong belief –1 and induce bias in the perceived intrinsic merit of the beliefs, the observed 
behavior may be consistent with a type 3 mechanism as well as a type 2 mechanism. Indeed, if the 
Fox network dramatically switched its position, we could even test which system applied by 
observing whether its audience dramatically shifted its belief or whether the audience’s beliefs 
remained sticky.  
Clearly if a special interest group, which could include a faction within the government, can 
use its resources to induce different media to propagate desired beliefs throughout the community, 
increase the intensity with which those beliefs are held and create or strengthen peer effects that 
punish dissenters, it could effectively freeze public opinion in a bad choice and create a very 
resilient attractor of the social dynamics at the stable state -1.   
 
6.  Application:  Adoption of ITQ's (Robert Repetto and Richard Allen) 
 
       Consider a group of fishermen who have operated under a fisheries management system that 
is plagued with rent dissipation problems. Call this institutional situation -1.  Assume an alternative 
management approach +1 appears that economists are sure will benefit the fishermen as a group.  
Of course, some of the fishermen may lose but suppose that the gainers will gain more than the 
losers will lose and so could fully compensate the losers and still have a surplus.  But, since none of 
the fishermen have operated under +1, suppose each of them is ambiguity averse and believe their 
own gain could take any value in the interval [h-B(0),h].  Thus, even though h>0, the worst-case 
outcome at date 0 is h-B(0)<0.  Thus, Section 5's results predict that the fishing community will 
stick at -1 and will oppose any move towards  +1.   If the intensity of choice is large and there are 
peer effects, few will try  +1 even if they are free to do so. If more than a threshold level have to 
choose +1 before it is allowed, this creates an additional force to stick the system at -1.  Scientists 
could attempt to shift the debate by publicizing the experience of New Zealand fisheries  (Hartley  
(1997)) or the natural experiment between Canadian and U.S. scallop fisheries (Repetto  (2001))  
but this is not nearly as convincing as the personal experience of a neighbor.     38
       A main issue in any rights-based system is how to allocate the tradable rights initially.  
Heterogeneity of interests within the fishing community is one major source of difficulty in 
deciding upon an initial allocation.  If there is a lot of heterogeneity that is not common knowledge, 
room is left for posturing by individual fishermen attempting to gain a larger share of the valuable 
rights. An aggressively selfish one could hold up action in an attempt to capture rents causing the 
negotiations to break down.  However, if fishermen’s circumstances and fishing histories are 
common knowledge, it will be more difficult for any one of them to claim special treatment in the 
initial rights allocation. Bewley (1986) points out that uncertainties about the outcomes of such 
bargaining games could cause the very ambiguity we discussed in Section 5 in people's minds 
about how institution +1 will actually operate in reality and what benefits they would experience. 
 
7.  Summary and Conclusions 
 
       This paper shows how simple discrete choice models of group dynamic choice can shed 
light on the ways group pressure on policy makers induces moves for or against the status quo 
relative to one or more alternatives.  It has shown how the interaction of dynamics within groups 
with the forces of conformity and/or complementarity, as well as the effect on the group effort of 
controls over free riding by group members, can produce policy macro-punctuations, e.g. abrupt 
changes, which seem inexplicable in terms of observable fundamentals. The analysis has shown 
how policies can remain static for long periods in the face of changing underlying fundamentals 
and how, in contrast, slow or modest changes in those fundamentals can occasionally lead to abrupt 
and discontinuous policy shifts.    
       We hope that this kind of analysis can help in enhancing understanding of abrupt changes in 
the policy domain and the ability to use observable facts to locate "lever points" where small efforts 
can be applied to escape policy "lock-in" bad social states, so that endogenous social dynamics can 
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i I thank Robert Repetto for essential help in editing and writing this paper.  I thank Giacomo Rondina for excellent 
help with formatting and preparation of graphs.  None of the above are responsible for errors.   
ii Discussions that are quite accessible but still precise enough to clarify the underlying science include Arthur, Durlauf, 
and Lane (1997), Durlauf  and  Young  (2001),  Colander  (2000),  and Gunderson and Holling (2002).   
iii See Durlauf and  Young  (2001)  for  an  extensive  discussion  of  this  very difficult problem. 
iv Although the modeling  relies  on some  mathematics  in  Brock  and  Durlauf  (2001a,b)  and  Scheffer  et   al. 
(2000, 2003), we shall attempt to explain everything  here  in  plain  English.  Readers that are not satisfied with the 
imprecision of English are  encouraged to consult these  references. The  two  articles  by  Scheffer  et  al. explain these 
ideas with minimal mathematics.  I will also minimize the use of mathematics but a modest amount is necessary. 
 
v See the review of Durlauf and Young (2001) with special  attention to the work of Charles Manski on identification of 
peer effects and  Glaeser and Scheinkman's work on modelling social interactions. 
vi     We point out for readers who want to follow up on mathematical details of this kind of modeling, that many 
formulations, including the one used  above, lead to  standard  cross  sectional  Laws  of  Large  Numbers,  Central  
Limit Theorems, and Least Absolute Deviations Theorems (Brock (1993), Ellis  (1985)) even though  there  are  
alternative  stable  states, as long as agents  are assumed to form certain predictions of the group average. 
vii  This is explained more fully in Brock and Durlauf (2001a).  Readers who wish to see the rather difficult 
mathematics that justifies this result are urged to look at Brock (1993), BD(1999), and BD(2001a,b).   
 
viii There is a close relationship between the problem of predicting the impending rapid shifts in social system 
dynamics that are the concern of this paper and the problem of predicting regime shifts in ecology  (Gunderson and 
Holling (2002)).  Ecological analysis stresses the role of drivers  (our h's) which are typically slow moving as well as 
nonlinearities caused by positive feedback loops in producing rapid shifts.  
 
ix For mathematically inclined readers  who  wish  to  see  the  mathematical foundations of this result, we note that 
Ellis  (1985)  does  a  nice  job  of explaining  how  increasing  "b"  and/or  J  from  bJ<1  to  bJ>1  causes  the 
"correlation lengths" amongst agents to "lengthen"  in  such  a  way  that  an infinite  series  which  measures  the  
"system  wide"   strength   of   these correlations diverges.  This divergence behavior enables the system to "escape the 
dead hand of history" and "leap" from a negative equilibrium to a positive equilibrium as "h" changes from negative to 
positive, no matter how small this change is. 
x Restriction of attention to binary cases as we have done to date is  very limiting.  However recent work by Bayer  and  
Timmins  (2001)  and  Brock  and Durlauf (2002, 2003) has considered discrete choice dynamics with more than 2 
choices.  Brock and Durlauf (2002), (2003) show that the number of alternative stable states multiplies rapidly with the 
number of distinct choices. They also show how recent work on "Curie-Weiss-Potts" models in statistical mechanics 
can produce results analogous to Result 3.1.  Such multinomial models are very interesting because the number of 
equilibria across which the system can jump becomes large as peer effects appear and choices proliferate, raising the 
potential for phase transitions.   
xi This is the classic Mancur Olson (Olson (1965)) problem treated by his classic book (Olson (1965)).  Olson's work, 
together with other ideas from social and political science, were used by Magee, Brock, and Young (1989), (hereafter 
MBY(1989)) in building a general theory of endogenous policy change. 
xii  It can also be modeled as a repeated game (Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker (1994), 
 hereafter OGW (1994)). Alternatively, MBY (1989) model this problem as a Nash non-cooperative game in the spirit 
of Olson (1965) and capture elements of Axelrod and OGW  (1994) by using two parameters, "noticeability" and 
"perceived effectiveness.”  Noticeability measures the extent to which free riders can be punished later on by some 
group sanction. (Axelrod  (1997)) Perceived effectiveness measures an agent’s belief about the effectiveness of his 
contribution to the group's goal.   
 
xiii Here we adapt  MBY's Mathematical Appendix (1989).   
xiv More elaborate functional forms that include the opposition’s contributions are given in MBY (1989).  MBY report 
empirical work using a "power index" (which is  a  product of the total sum of stakes and a concentration  index  of 
those stakes) to measure the effective supply of pressure by each group.   
 
xv Indeed, in late 2003, at the time of this writing, steel tariffs are a top news story.  In this particular case the users were 
concentrated and had a power index roughly equivalent to that of the producers.  The Bush administration had first   45
                                                                                                                                                                   
catered to the producers and imposed steel tariffs.  The users (including auto producers) were roughly equally 
concentrated and mustered strong pressure to remove the tariffs.  A final threat from the rest to the world "tipped" the 
Bush administration into removing the tariffs.  This very brief discussion illustrates a key point we wish to make in this 
paper.  A potentially useful approach to organizing action to remove bad policies would be to locate situations where 
the "power indices" of groups for and against a current bad policy are roughly equal.   Then allocate resources towards 
"tipping" the system away from bad policies in these particular situations.  The Bush administration steel tariffs are a 
good illustration of this strategy.  Standard economic benefit cost analysis like that used by MBY suggests that tariffs 
cause more damage than benefit.   Our suggested policy improvement algorithm focuses attention of reformers upon 
situations where the pressure groups are roughly "balanced" as was the case for the Bush administration steel tariffs.   
This example suggests a potential blueprint for environmental action:  Use a data base to locate bad environmental 
policies where well organized and powerful pressure groups are roughly balanced for and against.  Allocate political 
action resources to "tip" each "balanced" bad policy towards a good policy. 
 
xvi The model also can be used  to  prompt  discussions  of  campaign  finance reform in the U.S. political system and 
why it is so difficult.  If  money  is taken out of politics, something else will replace it  that  might  be  worse, such as 
incumbent advantage that  can  not  be  matched  by  challengers.   Of course, after money is banned, the state could 
fund challenger campaigns at an excess ratio  R>1  to  incumbent  campaigns  where  R  is  set  to  "equalize" challenger 
advantage to incumbent advantage.  But what about such groups as the elderly and labor whose contributions  are  
measured  in  terms  of  human effort rather than money.  Banning private contributions of money may end up turning 
the political system over to groups who contribute human effort rather than money.  The model helps keep  the  mind  
focused  on  the  heart  of  the problem:  Creation of a level playing field in the sense laid out above. 
xvii See Durlauf (2002) and Durlauf and Fafchamps (2003) for detailed reviews and discussion of the literature on social 
capital. 
xviii See my White Paper (Brock (2001)) for a discussion (in  English,  not mathematics) of this case as well as many 
issues related to the topics covered in this paper. 
xix There has been much interest recently in  modeling ambiguity aversion, which is sometimes called Knightian 
Uncertainty. We borrow here from models developed by Bewley (1986), (1987), Hansen  and Sargent (2003), Brock, 
Durlauf, and West (2003),  Brock  and  Durlauf  (2003).   
 
xx It is interesting to compare behaviors under Results of type 2 and type 3. In the type 3 case, nontrivial stochastic 
correlations are induced via peer effects in addition to the standard   deterministic dependencies across choices captured 
in type 2 Results.  Hence, when h-B(a(t)) passes through zero, the type 3 system immediately leaps to a point a(t+1) 
close to +1 and locks onto a state close to +1 as long as h remains positive 